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W
hy is there unsecured lending? Given that borrowers seem to
have essentially no obvious incentive to repay under the generous
provisions afforded them by U.S. consumer bankruptcy law, why
would anyone make an unsecured loan? One answer is that borrowers are
actuallyprovidingamoreintangibleformofcollateral,suchastheirreputation
or “good name.” Such an answer is problematic, however. In particular, can
households credibly bind themselves to agreements to which they may later
have little interest in keeping? What about lenders? In particular, notice that
lenders themselves have no incentive to act “punitively” after a bankruptcy
ﬁling. This is because if there are gains from renewed trade, any lender that
“renegotiates” with borrowers will proﬁt. In other words, in a competitive
setting, the only reasonable changes in credit terms are those warranted by a
change in assessing the likelihood of repayment.
Perhapsthemostnaturalrepresentationofthedestructionofareputational
formofcapitalinunsecuredloanmarketsisthereductioninthe“creditscore”
that typically follows a bankruptcy ﬁling. Thus, if neither borrowers nor
lenders can credibly promise to forgo mutually beneﬁcial transactions after a
default, there would seem to be little hope for unsecured credit. And yet, a
greatdealofsuchcreditexists, inanamountthatcurrentlyexceeds$1trillion!
The thorny issues raised above have, in large measure, been avoided
by quantitatively oriented researchers. Instead, they typically assume that
a penalty for default is exclusion from future borrowing, at least temporarily.
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However, for such analysis, the effects of exclusion on borrowing and lending
depend on the precise speciﬁcation of the income paths facing households.
To understand why, assume ﬁrst, as economists since Friedman (1957) have,
that households use credit markets to “smooth” consumption. That is, they
wish to shield consumption from changes in income. Smoothing occurs both
in response to predicted changes in income as well as to unforeseen ones. The
value of credit markets, in turn, depends on what households ask of them.
Notably, if income risk is large and extremely persistent, or permanent, the
householdhaslittlechoicebuttoreduceconsumptionwhenhitwithanegative
shock. In such a case, the value of access to the credit markets may be quite
low. If, instead, shocks are small or primarily transitory, borrowing will be an




role of exclusion following bankruptcy may depend on the precise speciﬁca-
tion of income risks faced by households, the relevant question is: In recent
quantitative models of bankruptcy, what role does credit exclusion play?
The two central contributions of this article are to (1) take a ﬁrst step
in evaluating the commonly used (but rarely justiﬁed) assumption in recent
modelsofunsecuredhouseholdborrowingofcredit thatdefaultingborrowers
get exiled and (2) quantitatively examine the role of exclusion in affecting the
sharp rise of both debt and bankruptcy observed in the 1990s. We consider
a simple model of consumer borrowing and lending developed in Athreya
(2002, 2004). This model shares enough with other recent work to be useful
in gleaning insights about exclusion. We organize our results around three
experiments. In the ﬁrst two, we investigate the extent to which reductions
in exclusion-related penalties matter for post-bankruptcy asset accumulation
under a variety of income processes. In the third experiment, we ask whether
these changes generate outcomes consistent with recent observations on ag-
gregates, such as the bankruptcy rate and debt discharged in bankruptcy.
Speciﬁcally, we proceed in two steps. First, we simulate counterfactual
exclusionary periods precisely to understand the extent to which exclusion
matters. Second, we link the length of credit exclusion to the level of compe-
tition in the unsecured lending market. The experiments performed in the ﬁrst
step will inform us as to the inherent “plausibility” of exclusion as a credible
phenomenon. That is, if exclusion is found to be a “binding” constraint, then
householdsvalueborrowingandwould, intheabsenceofotherconstraints, be
able to renegotiate loans with lenders. It has been observed that a high level
of competition in the unsecured credit market makes purely punitive exclu-
sion increasingly unlikely. This trend stems from a reduction in search and
switching costs for households. We employ the intuition that while punitiveK. B.Athreya and H. P. Janicki: Credit Exclusion 19
exclusion may be sustainable with a few lenders, it will not be with a large
number of them.
Our central ﬁndings are twofold. First, we ﬁnd that exclusion from credit
markets alone seems insufﬁcient to explain current repayment rates on unse-
cureddebt. Second, weobservethatareductioninexclusion-relatedpenalties
for bankruptcy arising from technological changes in the 1990s is consistent
with both growth in debt and personal bankruptcy.
One consideration that we address is the reason for borrowing. In par-
ticular, the nature of income shocks determines not only the usefulness of
borrowing, but also the misery inﬂicted by exclusion. Consider an example in
which a household faces minimal and transitory uncertainty nearly all of the
time, but is nonetheless prone to prolonged spells of relatively low income. In
such a world, the household may choose to borrow and may hold substantial
debtatthetimethatthe“long-term”shockoccurs. Inthissituation, thehouse-
hold may not value highly the option to borrow, simply because the shock is
expected to last a long time, thereby altering the present value of future earn-
ings nontrivially. In this setting, the household will not care greatly that it
will be excluded if it defaults. More troubling is that we may not be able to
easily disentangle a reduced need to borrow after bankruptcy from a willful
imposition of exclusion by creditors. Both causes have similar symptoms.
What Is Exclusion?
The sanctions assumed in recent work range from inﬁnitely long periods of
autarky for defaulters to relatively short periods where only borrowing is pro-
hibitedandsavingisallowed. Theformerpenaltieshavebeenusedextensively
to evaluate the best possible risk-sharing arrangements that are sustainable
given a party’s ability to walk away from contracts at any time. In these set-
tings, default does not occur in equilibrium. These studies dismiss the issue
of whether the penalties are credible. However, for their purposes, permanent
autarky may be appropriate as a harsh punishment that allows for a bound of
sortsonrisksharingunderlimitedcommitment. Bycontrast,whenattempting
to capture costs of default in the U.S. credit market, exclusion appears less
plausible because of the coexistence of ﬁnite penalties and default.
Purely temporary exclusion has been an attractive modeling device for
recent quantitative work, such as Athreya (2002, 2004) and Chatterjee et al.
(2005) on unsecured consumer debt, and Yue (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath
(2005), and Sapriza and Cuadra (2005) on sovereign debt. Nonetheless, such
exclusion is not easily supported and deserves more justiﬁcation than has
been provided. In particular, a key problem is that in choosing to punish
default ex post by exclusion, lenders and borrowers forgo opportunities for
mutually beneﬁcial trade that exist after default. In other words, once default
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and move on. However, the possibility of recontracting itself undermines
the initial obligation of the borrower to commit to repay. Unless the lender
can somehow credibly threaten to cut off the borrower from all creditors, the
problem is not easily circumvented.
Onecasewhereexclusionmaybeplausibleoccurswhenasingle,orsmall
number of, creditors may be able to coordinate to sustain ex post exclusion
as a credible threat. Furthermore, it is possible, even with a large number
of creditors and an inﬁnite horizon, to construct systems of beliefs among
marketparticipantssuchthatexclusionbecomessensibleexpost. Thesebelief
systems are, however, not immune to criticism. In the subsequent section, we
discuss an example where assumptions regarding these beliefs rationalize, at
one level, the presence of unsecured debt. Nevertheless, the lack of discipline
imposed on “off-equilibrium” beliefs can make ex post exclusion inefﬁcient.
There is a good deal at stake in understanding the nature of penalties for
default on unsecured debt. From an efﬁciency standpoint, limits to commit-
ment, alongwithprivateinformation, aretheprimesuspectsinthelimitedrisk
sharing we observe in the world around us. Moreover, since exclusion does
not involve transfers of resources across parties, these penalties are socially
wasteful ex post. Thus, unless offset by their ability to sustain better risk
sharing, deadweight penalties should be regarded with concern. From a dis-
tributional standpoint, there is perhaps even more at stake; it is reasonable to
suspect that the income-poorest are often the young, who, in turn, are wealth-
poor. Therefore, the inability to commit to repayment affects this subgroup
most profoundly, while leaving untouched those who may post collateral such
as home equity.
Recent Changes in the Unsecured Credit Market
Our interest in the potential implication of changes in the competitiveness of
the unsecured credit market is derived from the seminal studies of Ausubel
(1991) and Calem and Mester (1995). These studies conﬁrmed the popular
view of many that, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. market for
unsecuredcreditwasanimperfectlycompetitivemarketplaceinwhichrational
lenders systematically earned supernormal proﬁts. We now examine some
well-publicized changes in the structure of unsecured lending and assess its
role in driving the even more well-publicized increases in household debt and
bankruptcy. We divide our focus into two broad periods: the 1980s and the
1990s to the present.
The 1980s
The most important article in this relatively large body of literature might be
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1980s, returns in unsecured credit markets were highly supernormal. More-
over, and more intriguing, was that the market seemed to offer a near textbook
case of perfect competition. In particular,Ausubel documents that there were
in excess of 4,000 lenders and that free entry seemed possible. In particular,
Ausubel (1991) notes that the ten largest lenders accounted for only two-ﬁfths
of market share and therefore could not be said to monopolize the market.
The returns to credit card lending grow even more puzzling as it is difﬁcult to
ﬁnd any evidence of overt collusion or price ﬁxing. One ﬁnding in particular
has spurred substantial analysis, namely, the feature that credit card interest
rates are remarkably insensitive to changes in the measured cost of funds. In
conclusion, Ausubel (1991) suggests three possibilities for the observed be-
havior of the credit card market. First, he allows for departures from standard
consumer rationality, and argues that in a setting with irrational households
that systematically underestimate their own likelihood of carrying credit card
balances, lenders may be able to earn supernormal proﬁts. Second, Ausubel
allows for search and switching costs to reﬂect several hurdles that lie in
front of those wishing to switch credit cards. Lastly, Ausubel suggests that
asymmetric information regarding the default risk of borrowers could make it
difﬁcult to control risk using interest rates. In particular, a fall in the rate of-
fered by a lender might simply attract a disproportionate response from those
most likely to default, and would generate only indifference from low-risk
households that often did not carry balances on which they paid interest. In
this setting, one might reasonably expect retail interest rates to move far less
in response to changes in funding costs than when more was known about
cardholders.
An important article that pursues the conjectures of Ausubel (1991) in
explaining credit card interest-rate stickiness is that of Calem and Mester
(1994). These authors conclude that all three aspects of Ausubel’s reasoning
receive empirical support when data from individual consumers (from the
Survey of Consumer Finances) is used. Notably, Calem and Mester do ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant role for the effect of both search and switching costs. One of the
costs they note that is that while borrowers provide real-time information on
theirﬁnancialsituationthroughtheirrepaymentbehavior,creditbureaudatain
the 1980s was not updated as frequently. In turn, while lenders had measures
oftheriskposedbytheirowncardholders,thisriskwasonlypartiallyrevealed,
as it did not reveal the behavior of the same individual with respect to other
accounts, nor the risk posed by new account holders. More subtly, as noted
by Calem and Mester (1995), high switch costs can independently limit the
value of search, leading again to stickiness in interest rates.
The 1990s to the Present
The preceding work deals with a period immediately prior to a noticeable
change in technology for intermediation. As documented by Furletti (2003),22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
FDIC (2004), and Edelberg (2003), the use of large-scale credit scoring and
intensive data mining led to large changes in the growth of information avail-
able to lenders. In turn, search costs fell. Notably, to the extent that search
couldbeinitiatedbyeitherbuyerorseller,amajorchangeinthe1990swasthe
growth of massive preapproved, direct-mail solicitation. Figure 1 (all ﬁgures
appear at the end of this article) shows that even a casual viewing of the data
makes clear that an important “regime change” occurred in the early 1990s.
To the extent that technological advances mitigated adverse selection, price-
based completion grew more attractive. Indeed, Furletti (2003) and Edelberg
(2003)arguethatthesechangespavedthewayformuchmoredetailedpricing
strategies according to cardholder risk.1 Perhaps the most interesting aspect
about the 1990s was the growth of debt and bankruptcy to unprecedented
levels.
The facts documented above for the 1990s can be expected to result in a
reduction or elimination of exclusion. Moreover, these changes may be ex-
pected to ﬁrst generate a transitional period during which repayment rates on
credit contracts issued prior to the early 1990s did not reﬂect the intensifying
competition. Additionally, in the longer run, we might expect a “supply side”
response leading to a repricing of terms to accommodate this new reality. The
ﬁrst period might well be associated with increased borrowing and default,
while in the longer run, the repricing of the riskier loans might led to a fall
in default rates (all else equal). Once again, the preceding experiment is only
partially a natural one because of the simultaneous change in the technology
of credit intermediation. Athreya (2004) explores the effects of a fall in trans-
actions costs on borrowing and default and ﬁnds that it accounted well for the
period between 1991 and 1997. In this article, we abstract from technological
advances and focus exclusively on the aggregate consequences of reductions
in credit exclusion for debt, bankruptcy, and credit supply.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 1, we document some
recent empirical evidence on the consequences of bankruptcy. We also brieﬂy
presentatheoreticalmodelandsomequantitativetheorytoreviewthestandard
approach to incorporating credibility of ex post punishment and use of assets
for consumption smoothing. Section 2 presents a simple model and evidence
from counterfactual experiments to examine the extent to which household
behavior is dictated by exclusion and income. In Section 3, we extend the
model to address the effects of exclusion on the aggregate unsecured credit
market. Section 4 concludes.
1 See Athreya (2004) for an account of these changes and the implication they have for
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1. BACKGROUND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAND THEORY
Consequences of Bankruptcy: Empirical Evidence
Several recent articles have gathered empirical evidence that argues that
bankruptcy blights a credit score. Stavins (2000) ﬁnds that having been
turned down for credit makes one substantially more likely to have ﬁled for
bankruptcy in the past. Relatedly, and perhaps as a consequence, bankruptcy
ﬁlers are less likely to hold at least one credit card if they have ﬁled for
bankruptcy in the past. These two observations are suggestive, but they do
not have an unambiguous interpretation of forcible “exclusion” from credit
markets. Ideally, what one would like to know is the probability of rejec-
tion given a past bankruptcy. Instead, what we know from Stavins (2000)
is the probability of having ﬁled a bankruptcy given that one is rejected for
credit. The second observation is perhaps more informative, as the absence of
a credit card means that households have foregone the potential transactions-
related beneﬁts of convenience associated with credit cards. On the other
hand, the growth of debit cards allows for access to the payment network of
Visa, Mastercard, and others without the need for a credit card. Moreover,
the quantitative differences between those with a prior bankruptcy and those
withoutarenotsolarge. Inparticular,Stavins(2000)ﬁndsthatthemeannum-
ber of credit cards held by those with a past bankruptcy was 2.91, while it was
3.58 for those without a bankruptcy. This also calls into question the extent to
which bankruptcy ﬁlers are truly “excluded.”Among the strongest ﬁndings in
Stavins (2000) is that a past bankruptcy was predictive of future delinquency.
This suggests that something systematic characterizes bankruptcy ﬁlers that
warrants differentially strict treatment, such as more frequent rejections in
credit application. Once again, the data do not speak with one voice, because
the interest rates faced by those having ﬁled averaged only one percentage
point more than those who had not. Thus, conditional on obtaining an unse-
cured credit card loan, past bankruptcy ﬁlers appear not to be paying a great
premium.
In the United States, credit bureaus are important institutions that aggre-
gate debt and repayment data across consumers and over time. In the scoring
models most commonly used, such as Fair Isaac & Co. (FICO), the leading
issuer of credit scores, repayment history is a major determinant of score.
In turn, scores are interpreted by lenders as measures of risk, implying that
the drop in credit score triggered by bankruptcy leads to at least temporary
repricing and possibly exclusion from unsecured borrowing.
InadditiontoStavins,anotherimportantreferenceintheliteratureonpost-
bankruptcy credit extension is that of Musto (2004), who exploits a natural
experiment created by laws limiting the length of time a bankruptcy may be
retained on a credit record to ten years. The main ﬁnding of the latter is
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from a credit record has an immediate and economically signiﬁcant effect on
household indebtedness. When those with high and medium credit ratings
were studied, as measured by FICO, the average credit lines jumped in the
tenth year from $2,810 to $4,578.
Lastly, Fisher, Filer, and Lyons (2000) study a panel of households that
have ﬁled for bankruptcy, and they argue that the consumption of this group
is somewhat more sensitive to income than in the period preceding the ﬁling.
This is consistent with borrowing constraints binding in the post-bankruptcy
period. Furthermore, the authors ﬁnd that after ﬁve years beyond the removal
of the bankruptcy from a credit record, consumption ceases to be excessively
sensitive to income. Again, this is consistent with bankruptcy leading to a
temporary cutoff from unsecured credit markets.
Exclusion in Theory: A Simple Example
Given the observation that sovereign debt and unsecured consumer debt mar-
kets both exist, work on supporting punishments as credible threats has occu-
pied the time and imagination of theorists for some time. A textbook example
of such a system of beliefs is taken from Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, Ch. 6,
376–77). In this example, there are a large number of a risk-averse nations
facing uncertain country-speciﬁc output. However, all shocks to output are
uncorrelated across countries, and there is, therefore, the possibility for com-
plete insurance. However, it is also assumed that each nation may walk away
withitscurrentincomeatanytime. Theonlypenaltyisapermanentexclusion
from credit markets. The key question is whether such a punishment can be
credible. Below is a set of beliefs and strategies that generate credibility. If
country A is to be penalized by the others, (1) it must be that country A has
no reputation for repayment, and (2) all other countries lose their own reputa-
tions for repayment by dealing with countryA. Note that without clause (2), a
country could default and then buy an insurance contract against income risk
by putting up money up front, thereby removing all credit risk. With clause
(2) in place, no defaulting country would dare send money to a country that
agreed to insure it. This is also beneﬁcial because it conﬁrms the beliefs held
by the nondefaulters about country A. Namely, since country A believes that
any insurer B will default at the ﬁrst chance, country A will default on any
obligations it has to country B. In turn, country B would be optimizing by
seizing any payments by countryA.
What is notable about this example is not so much that punishments may
be sustained, but that they depend intricately on the systems of beliefs held
by market participants. Moreover, to the extent that we do not have deﬁnitive
means of winnowing the sets of beliefs that are “plausible,” such resolutions
are somewhat troubling. There is also a more serious problem, namely that
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credible in that they remain in the interest of countries to impose ex post,
they are not immune to renegotiations. We now examine a problem with
the belief system discussed above. In particular, all the gains from trade
that could be realized between the parties go unrealized. In the preceding
example, the problem arises because even though the speciﬁcation of beliefs
makes it sensible for the borrower to take the threat of exclusion seriously,
the actual imposition of the threat ex post is inefﬁcient for all parties. This
createsincentivesforallparties,notjusttheonesthathaveexperienceddefault,
to create other contractual arrangements beyond those rendered unworkable
given people’s beliefs. As a result, one might expect that ex ante, the threat of
exclusion will once again become ineffective to sustain risk sharing.
Value ofAsset Markets in Quantitative Theory
To obtain an initial measure of the value of assets for smoothing, and thereby
thepressurenottoimposeexclusionexpost,weturnnowtoacanonicalmodel
of savings and consumption taken from Deaton (1991). A broad lesson of this
work is that temporary shocks will generally be smoothed via borrowing and










In the preceding, consumption in period t is given by ct, β is the discount
factor, and κ speciﬁes risk aversion. The latter is a key parameter governing
the extent to which households borrow to keep consumption smooth in the




≤ y + a
a  ≥ 0,
where y denotes income from sources other than wealth, a, and r denotes
the interest rate. Notice that there is a restriction that a  ≥ 0, ruling out
borrowing. However, the exercise is still instructive because our primary goal
is to understand the effect of limits on the decumulation of wealth, with an
exclusion from borrowing being a special case. If we now specify a simple
AR(1) income process
yt − y = ϕ(yt−1 − y)+  t,
where
 t ∼ N(0,σ),26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1
Persistence (ϕ)- 0.40 0.00 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
1. s.d. y 10.90 10.00 10.50 11.50 14.00 22.90
2. estimated. s.d. y 10.80 10.20 10.00 11.40 13.30 27.50
3. estimated. s.d. c 4.60 5.10 6.70 7.60 10.40 25.90
ratio s.d. c
s.d. y 0.43 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.78 0.94
we obtain Table 1 from Deaton (1991).
Notice that as shocks become more persistent, households choose not to
smooth shocks. The ratio of the standard deviation of consumption to that of
income grows systematically with the persistence of shocks to income. The
intuition here is that highly persistent negative shocks, for example, have a
grave impact on lifetime income. To the extent that it is lifetime income that
determines in large part the long-run average level of consumption, a large
downward revision demands a reduction in average consumption. In other
words, households will generally be unwilling to borrow against a greatly
diminished future income just to avoid today the anticipated pain of a bad
event. Bycontrast, ahighlypersistentpositiveshockimpliesarelativelylarge
upward revision in future income prospects. In light of this, households will
reduce their indebtedness or increase their savings. Lastly, take the extreme
casewheretheshockstoincomearepermanent. Anexampleofthisisa“raise”
insalarythatalsoresetsthe“base”atwhichfutureraisesarecomputed. Inthis
case, the positive shock may lead to borrowing in anticipation of future good
times. At the other extreme, if a permanent bad shock occurs, households
may actually increase their savings to allow them to make the transition more
smoothly to a permanently lower level of income.
The implications of this example for a world with bankruptcy are note-
worthy. In particular, it matters a great deal whether one lives in a world of
highly persistent income risk. If so, credit markets are not useful to house-
holds anyway, and credit exclusion is not painful. In short, the incentives
to default for any given debt level are relatively large when compared to
a world of less persistent income risk. On the other hand, the usefulness
of bankruptcy in such a setting is less obvious. After all, little smoothing
can be done via borrowing in such an environment. Ironically, exclusion
may be “sustainable” in this setting simply because there is not much at stake
for creditors in imposing it.
With more transitory shocks, however, the incentives to borrow for con-
sumption smoothing are relatively large, and the threat carried by a credible
promise of exclusion following default is meaningful. Nonetheless, ex post
exclusionhurtsthehouseholdpreciselybecauseitvaluesborrowingandraises
the issue of the credibility of an exclusion. Credibility is even more implausi-K. B.Athreya and H. P. Janicki: Credit Exclusion 27
ble when it is assumed to be imposed by a highly competitive industry where
consumers are well aware of competitors’terms and rates.
As we will see in the following section, the presence of default makes the
results above less obvious. In particular, one’s willingness to smooth even
temporary disturbances may depend importantly on the presence of longer-
term shocks and the ability to default should such shocks occur. Conversely,
even a persistent shock may be smoothed by a household that has access to
a default option. In particular, bankruptcy introduces an incentive to “gam-
ble” that is not otherwise present. In the present context, the household may
gamble by borrowing more than it otherwise would just to ensure a smooth
consumption path, knowing that bankruptcy is a possibility should poor in-
comes continue. Of course, creditors will price such risk, and in the end,
households may choose not to borrow in equilibrium. Therefore, the net
effect of bankruptcy on the equilibrium willingness of households to smooth
shocks is not perfectly straightforward and remains a quantitative issue.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
Tostudytheeffectsofexclusionandthedependenceoftheeffectsofexclusion










Households save in risk-free claims to consumption that mature in the
next period. Savings earns an interest rate of (1 + rd). Households have the
option of defaulting on debt. In each period, the household chooses whether
to ﬁle for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is kept simple and is assumed to remove
all the debt of a household.
Bankruptcy generates two costs. Households must pay transactions costs
associated with legal proceedings, as well as have their utility lowered by any
stigma they may feel. Moreover, households are assumed to be temporarily
bannedfromborrowing. Wedenotethesumofallcoststhatdidnotarisefrom
credit exclusion by λ and the length of the average exclusionary period by γ.
The preceding structure leads to the following set of value functions.2
At any date, households are either solvent, which we denote by S,o r
“borrowing constrained” while excluded because of a past bankruptcy, which
we denote by BC.
2 See Athreya (2004) for more details.28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The value of being solvent, V S, must satisfy
V S(y,a) = max[WS(y,a),WB(y,a)]. (2)
The value of repaying debt in the current period satisﬁes




1 + rl(a )
≤ y + a. (4)
If a household ﬁles for bankruptcy, their debts are removed, and they pay the
transactions costs, λ.
In the period following a bankruptcy, the household is excluded from
borrowing, which means that the value, V BC, from beginning in this state is




1 + rd ≤ y. (6)
The exclusion from credit markets ends each period with probability, γ, with
the average restriction from borrowing lasting 1/(1-γ)periods. The value of
this state is therefore




1 + rd ≤ y + a. (8)
Let the default probability for a debt of d units be denoted θbk(a ). In equi-
librium, economic proﬁts must be zero. Therefore, given the cost of funds
for intermediaries, (1+rd +τ), where τ is a transactions cost that represents
recordkeeping and other operational expenses, the interest rate on loans will
be restricted to
rl(a ) =
(1 + rd + τ)
(1 − θbk(a ))
− 1. (9)
Parameterization
With this simple model of consumer borrowing and bankruptcy, we evaluate
the interplay between income persistence, the size of income shocks, the ex-
clusionary period, and desired borrowing. We study ﬁve income processes,
which differ along two dimensions: the persistence of shocks, denoted by ϕ,
and their variance, denoted by σ2. The ﬁrst process is our benchmark, takenK. B.Athreya and H. P. Janicki: Credit Exclusion 29
Table 2
Income Process μσ 2 ϕ
YB 10 .15 0.97
Y1 10 .10 0.50
Y2 10 .10 0.99
Y3 10 .30 0.50
Y4 10 .30 0.99
from Athreya (2004). It is an AR(1) process broadly consistent with panel
data on U.S. households and includes low income states that are interpretable
as “unemployment.” For brevity, the reader is referred to Athreya (2004) for
details on the (discretized) version of this process. The key parameters of that
process are the mean level of income, μ, which we ﬁx at unity, the variance
among working households, set to 0.15, and the serial correlation of income,
set at 0.97. The remainder of the processes involve changes in the variability
persistence of income shocks relative to the benchmark, where we hold mean
income ﬁxed. The processes are summarized in Table 2. One period in the
model represents one quarter. The remaining parameters are given as κ = 1
(which implies logarithmic utility), τ = 0.0085, β = 0.9865.
Using these processes, we simulate the income, consumption, savings,
and bankruptcy decisions of a large number of households. We then evaluate
household behavior immediately prior to, and following, a bankruptcy ﬁling.
Speciﬁcally, we concentrate our attention to the 10 quarters preceding and
20 quarters following a bankruptcy. We study the behavior of cross-sectional
averages in each quarter of this 30-quarter window. Our goal is to evaluate
the extent that exclusion from credit markets is actually a binding restriction
that requires explanation. For example, if, for the benchmark income pro-
cess, removing exclusion did not change post-bankruptcy debt accumulation,
we would know that exclusion cannot be an important deterrent to default.
By contrast, if removing exclusion did imply a substantial increase in post-
bankruptcy debt, we have evidence that exclusion matters.
For the remainder of this section, we focus on Figures 2–6. These ﬁg-
ures display the path of average quantities in the window around the date of
bankruptcy, where date 0 on the x-axis is the period of the bankruptcy ﬁling.
The top panel in Figures 2–6 presents the results where no post-bankruptcy
exclusionisassumed. ThemiddlepanelinFigures2–6containsresultsacross
the income process when exclusion is set as in Athreya (2004) to an average
of four years. By contrast, in the bottom panel in Figures 2–6, we assume a
lengthy exclusion of 25 years. For reasonable discount factors, exclusions of
such high duration generate outcomes similar to a truly permanent exclusion.30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Experiment 1: Effects of Income Risk, Given
Exclusion
We begin by holding exclusion, γ, and ﬁling costs, λ, ﬁxed. We vary the
income process in order to display the effects of income volatility and persis-
tence on asset accumulation and decumulation before and after a bankruptcy.
In the top panel of Figures 2–6, we set γ = 0 (no exclusion). When compar-
ing the top panel across Figures 2–6, we see immediately that asset holdings
are uniformly higher at all dates under processes Y 1 and Y 3, both of which
display relatively low persistence, than under Y 2 or Y 4, both of which display
high persistence. The intuition here is the same as presented earlier. Note ﬁrst
that the average income preceding a bankruptcy is falling for the population.
Given the mean-reversion implicit in all the income processes under consid-
eration, we see that on average, after a ﬁling, incomes rise again and then
level off at their long-term average. The positive income shocks that occur
on average to bankruptcy ﬁlers after they ﬁle are treated as temporary under
processesY 1 andY 3 andtreatedassomewhatmorepermanentundertheother
two processes. In turn, the former save some of the gains and accumulate
a “buffer stock” of savings. The relationship between persistence and asset
holdings is robust and survives in the middle and bottom panels of Figures
2–6 as well. However, the behavior of assets across the income process grows
more similar as exclusion becomes longer lasting.
Experiment 2: Effects of Exclusion, Given Income
Risk
We now turn to the experiment of central interest: the effect of varying ex-
clusion under a ﬁxed income process. A comparison across panels of each
of Figures 2–6 shows that increased exclusion is met after bankruptcy by in-
creased asset accumulation. Preceding a bankruptcy, asset paths are quite
similar across exclusionary periods. What is perhaps more important to see
is that even when exclusion is eliminated (top panel in Figures 2–6), house-
holds simply do not borrow much after bankruptcy. This is true across all four
income processes considered here. It suggests that a valid interpretation of
the observation is that households are not simply excluded from borrowing;
rather they do not wish to borrow after bankruptcy.
One consideration worth mentioning is that our experiments consider the
equilibrium effect of changes in exclusion. Namely, households are assumed
to know, understand, and respond to the changes. In turn, note that our results
focus on the behavior of those in and around a bankruptcy ﬁling. Therefore,
when exclusion becomes strict, it is possible that we observe bankruptcy only
in those circumstances when ex post exclusion would be least painful, all else
equal. Forexample, consideraworldwithlongexclusionaryperiodsandboth
transitory and long-lasting income shocks, such as the processes used here. InK. B.Athreya and H. P. Janicki: Credit Exclusion 31
suchasetting, onemightexpectthatbankruptcybecomesusedpredominantly
when debts are large and a persistent shock strikes, rather than when a more
transitory shock occurs. Our ﬁndings suggest that this effect is unimportant,
as average incomes at the time of ﬁling are very similar across Figures 2–6.
In the discretized income process we employ, the income level “triggering”
bankruptcy is always the state we associate with prolonged unemployment at
a time when unemployment insurance beneﬁts no longer are provided.
A second issue is that even if the circumstances at the time of ﬁling are
not affected strongly by bankruptcy, the rate at which people ﬁle may be
materially altered by credit exclusion. This happens in part because debt
accumulation overall may change signiﬁcantly, making exclusion important
as a deterrent even when it leaves the proximate “cause” (i.e., the state of
the household at the time of ﬁling) of bankruptcy unchanged. We address
this issue next by evaluating the effects of exclusion on aggregate unsecured
credit-market activity in terms of debt accumulation, bankruptcy rates, and
loanpricing. Wealsoprovideaﬁrstlookatstudyinganarrativethataddresses
recent technological changes that have reduced search and switching costs for
households and have led to greater effective competition across lenders.
3. COMPETITION IN UNSECURED CREDIT MARKETS
Athreya(2004)proposesanexplanationforeventsdetailedabovebymodeling
technological advances by reductions in transactions costs and ﬁnds that such
changes produce outcomes broadly consistent with the data. In the current
work, we propose a different approach. Namely, we emphasize in this article
that while reductions in transactions costs are part of the story, the fact that
search and switching costs in particular have fallen may resurrect the credi-
bility problem faced by unsecured lenders. In other words, a borrower who
has defaulted now has an easier time communicating his risk to prospective
lenders, as better credit bureau data are available to lenders. Moreover, a bor-
rowermaymoreeasilyevaluatethequalityofoffersfromaverywiderangeof
solicitorsbothbecausehereceivesroughlyﬁvetimesasmanyoffersinthelate
1990s as he did in the late 1980s, and also because disclosure regulations such
as the “Schumer Box” allow for easy comparisons of rates and terms. These
changes, in turn, must begin to force lenders to “treat bygones as bygones.”
Therefore, the only remaining rationale for treating bankruptcy ﬁlers like “hot
potatoes” is that they must have revealed something about themselves that
makes them undesirable.
A key issue here is the following: To what extent does bankruptcy dif-
ferentiate households into persistently different risk categories? Answering
this question requires answering the question of “who” bankruptcy ﬁlers are.
Athreya (2004) summarizes work by Sullivan, Warren, andWestbrook (1989,
2000), and others, reaching the conclusions that along many relevant dimen-32 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
sionssuchasage, education, andincome, bankruptcyﬁlersappeartobe“mid-
dle class” people who have gotten unlucky. While some of this poor luck was
persistent,muchoftheimmediatehistoryprecedingbankruptcyﬁlingswasnot
atypical. Once again, there in an inherent conﬂict in arguing that bankruptcy
leads to credit embargoes that ﬁlers are mainstream households. After all,
mainstream households would not be treated as pariahs unless they were truly
different from the remainder of the population.
Experiment 3: Are Rising Indebtedness and Default
Rates Consistent With Reduced Search and Switching
Costs?
We now assume that the improvements in informational ﬂows between bor-
rowers and lenders have led to competitive behavior, especially in terms of
lenders no longer being able to sustain the credit exclusion of bankruptcy ﬁl-
ers. Athreya(2004)investigatestheroleofreducingthecostofintermediation
itselfandﬁndsthatsuchchangesimplymoreindebtednessanddefault. Inthis
article, we focus solely on discerning the effects of reduced credit exclusion,
while fully acknowledging that both processes may (and indeed seem likely
to) have occurred together. To generate the quantitative implications of such
a change, we ask whether the total elimination of any means of ex post credit
exclusion,wherebyγ = 0,producesincreasesinbankruptcyanddebtbroadly
consistent with the data since the early 1990s.
We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst allow for the removal of exclusion in a
way that creditors are not fully aware of the change. This allows us to capture
the initial effects of reductions in search costs that facilitated more switching
among debtors. In particular, we study this “transitional” period by holding
theloanpricingfunctionﬁxed atitsinitialsteadystatelevel. Wethenallowfor
prices to adjust as lenders learn their environment and compute a new steady
state equilibrium.3 Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is seen in column one of Table 3. We
study the effects of setting γ = 0 under the benchmark income process.
3A natural criticism could be that we allow borrowers to learn about the new environment
before creditors do. Note, however, that we assume that the technological change (i.e., reduced
search and switching costs) was unanticipated. Therefore, loans made just prior to adopting the
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As inAthreya (2004), the initial steady state assumes an exclusionary pe-
riod averaging 16 quarters (four years), and thereby sets γ = 0.9375, and
under the benchmark income process, matches several aggregate U.S. un-
secured credit and default facts. When exclusion is eliminated, the initial
transition period is quite striking. Notably, the quarterly aggregate default
rate rises sharply from 0.12 percent to 0.18 percent, a 50 percent increase in
quarterly ﬁling rates! The increase in ﬁlings is in part driven by the temporary
mispricing of credit risk, which households use to their advantage. This is
seen along both the “extensive” margin of borrowing, whereby more people
borrow, and the “intensive” margin, whereby borrowers are more indebted
thanbefore. Intermsofthefractionofborrowers, thereisaverylarge7.1per-
centage point, or roughly a 20 percent increase in the fraction of households
that borrow. Overall indebtedness, as measured by the conditional mean of
debt among those who borrow, also grows substantially, from approximately
$3,400 in the benchmark to $5,050 in the transition. These facts are all qual-
itatively consistent with the observations over the early 1990s, during which
margins fell while debt and bankruptcies both grew. As lenders adjust pricing
to a world in which exclusion is simply unsustainable, credit supply effec-
tively shrinks, reducing indebtedness and default along with it. This is seen
in the top block of column one in Table 3. The fraction of borrowers falls
back from its transitional maximum to a lower level that is very close to the
initial steady state. Conversely, to get a measure of the deterrent power of
exclusion, we present results for the case where exclusion is increased so as to
average 25 years. In essence, this represents nearly permanent exclusion. In
this case, the previous intuition goes through in reverse, whereby borrowing
and default initially fall very sharply, but then result in long-run loan terms
that make borrowing attractive again, as seen in Figure 7. These features can
also be seen in Figure 8. In the long run, bankruptcy nearly disappears, but
borrowing increases to the point where roughly one-third (32.4 percent) of all
households borrow, and when they do, they actually borrow more than under
benchmark exclusion, at $5,050. These results are largely robust across the
entiresetofincomeprocessesweconsider, andforbrevity, wereferthereader
to Table 3 and Figures 9–12 for details.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our ﬁnding that the removal of ex post exclusion leads to greatly increased
bankruptcy rates and indebtedness is striking. A corollary is that the other
costs of bankruptcy—namely, fees, time costs, and ultimately, the shame or
“stigma” felt by ﬁlers—must be very acute indeed. After all, even in the
absence of exclusion, the credit market in our model continues to exist rather
than collapse, even though stigma-related costs were held ﬁxed throughout.K. B.Athreya and H. P. Janicki: Credit Exclusion 35
Inotherwords, stigmaisarguablyevenmoreimportant, andmightbeallthere
is, in keeping unsecured credit markets in existence.
Filing-related costs are important and worrisome, because they indicate
that unless monetary policymakers act to provide repayment commitment, at-
titudesmaybeallthatliebetweenthecurrentsettingandasettinginwhichthe
young and the wealth-poor generally cannot obtain credit. In particular, one
institutional impediment to the commitment to repay is the U.S. bankruptcy
code. Even after currently enacted reforms take hold, it is still unconstitu-
tional to write contracts waiving the right to bankruptcy. At present, only the
wealthy, who might post collateral, can do so. One alternative is that exemp-
tions be stricter, as they implicitly will make much of the borrowing of even
the wealth-poor collateralized. On the other hand, the beneﬁts arising from
an increase in strictness of exemptions must be weighed against the costs im-
posed by facing a rigid repayment schedule in an environment of nontrivial
income risk.
The results presented here are simple and suggestive, but by no means
deﬁnitive. Yet, they point to several directions for future research, all of
which seem essential if we are to explain the rich array of unsecured credit
products in a world where penalties appear nebulous and even unavailable.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Annual Credit Card Solicitations
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Figure 8 Transitional Effect of Change in γ with Unadjusted Pricing
Income Process: YB
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Figure 9 Transitional Effect of Change in γ with Unadjusted Pricing
Income Process: Y1
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